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Rural Iowa in the 1920s and 1930s
Roots of the Farm Depression
LELAND L. SAGE
THE TWO DECADES under examination in this conference, the
second has enjoyed far more exploitation by scholars and is far
better known by general readers than the first. The twenties
have elicited many different interpretations over succeeding
decades.^ If the experts disagree, sometimes violently, what can
we expect from those who read as they run? There is a ten-
dency, among people in all walks of life to ignore or minimize
the farm depression of the twenties. The scenario so often pre-
sented is that of a decade of prosperity ending with the slide into
the Wall Street debacle of 1929, followed by the Great Depres-
sion and then the rescue by the New Deal. The Farm Depres-
sion, if remembered at all, is brought in as an afterthought.
Reference here is not to agricultural historians, who properly
treat those years as a decade of farm tragedy, monumental in
themselves, and as prelude to and partial cause of the catas-
trophe of 19'29.
1. Henry F. May, "Shifting Perspectives on the 1920s," Mississippi Valley
Historical Review 43 (December 1956), 405-27, deals mostly with art,
literature, and philosophy, but has a few pages on economic history, 421-425.
Paul Allen Carter, Another Part of the Twenties (New York, 1977), has
nothing on the subject of agriculture, but has many insights of value for a stu-
dent of the era.
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If we can rid ourselves of the notion of "definitive" history
in favor of Professor Richard N. Current's definition of history
as an "ongoing colloquy" rather than a presentation of final
truth, we may expect more writing and more light on the twen-
ties and thirties. This conference is to be commended as a part
of that ongoing colloquy.
Students of recent farm history seem to be agreed that since
World War I the United States agricultural establishment, of
which Iowa is an important part, has faced the continuous and
continuing problem inherent in its capability to produce
surpluses—marginal amounts—which are beyond the capacity
of the national free enterprise system to absorb in an economic
manner. A corollary to this point is the search for parity of farm
prices in relation to the prices of goods the farmers must buy. In
a word, we call this the "farm problem." When did that problem
first appear and what are its roots?
This capability is not a post-1918 phenomenon: The United
States was on the verge of such a problem in 1913-14 as the
Golden Age of Agriculture, so called because parity prices were
a reality, was coming to an end.^  Only the unexpected advent of
World War I saved us from an almost certain surplus. The war
created an insatiable market for all that our agricultural and in-
dustrial systems could produce. The amount of production, and
therefore the volume of exports in 1914, was pretty well deter-
mined by late July-early August, when the war began, but in
1915 and 1916 exports rose noticeably. Then with the United
States' entrance in the war on April 6, 1917, the demands for
2. There is some divergence among scholars as to the dates of the Golden
Age of Agriculture. John T. Schiebecker, Whereby We Thrive: A History of
American Farming, 1607-1972 (Ames, Iowa, 1974), 151, uses the dates 1898 to
1914; Willard W. Cochrane, The Development of American Agriculture: A
Historical Analysis (Minneapolis, 1979), 100, sets 1910 to 1914 as the Golden
Age, and labels the period of 1897 to 1910 as the "good years." Schiebecker,
159, presents convincing evidence of the decline of our domestic and export
markets by 1914; the per capita consumption of meat, potatoes, and wheat
flour fell off noticeably between 1900 and 1914. Cotton exports held up
though cotton was selling in 1914 for seven cents per pound. The percentage of
the wheat and corn crops exported was down from 1900: wheat from 35.84
percent to 19.07 percent. Census figures show that the average net income
from farming, nationwide, rose only from $4,176,000,000 to $4,181,000,000
between 1910 and 1914. U. S. Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics
of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, D. C , 1960), 483.
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goods of every sort became limitless. Farmers were challenged:
"If You Can't Fight, Farm: Food Will Win The War." They were
encouraged to plough up their pastures and the roadsides and to
employ the utmost in skill and know-how in order to increase
production. Worse yet as to future effects but seemingly good
business at the time, the government and private bankers urged
farmers to use their profits and their credit and buy more land,
even at the high prices of 1918-19.^  Farmers went the limit on
production and in land purchases—how could one lose with the
demand for food so great and a safety net of guaranteed
minimum prices? Unfortunately there was no Jeremiah around
in 1917-18 to warn farmers that this was an open invitation to
disaster; early in 1919, when much of the damage had been
done, Henry C. Wallace did speak up when he editorialized on
the dangers of the mania for more land: "If we don't start climb-
ing down the ladder a rung at a time, there will be a disturbance
of some kind and someone will get pushed off the ladder to land
with a thud at the bottom.""
The wartime prosperity created a dizzying effect for the
moment, a kind of fool's paradise, and also created two long
range effects: First, the United States was turned rather sud-
denly into a creditor nation instead of a debtor, with all the
varying aspects of that unaccustomed role. And second, by
1917 the Entente Allies had exhausted their available gold and
their savings based on trade credits, which had enabled them
since 1914 to pay in cash. They were now forced into a borrow-
ing program which created the War Debts Problem which was
to poison international relations for a generation, and domestic
3. William G. Murray, "Iowa Land Values—1803-1967," The Palimpsest
18 (October 1967), 461-68, deals with the years 1901 to 1920. Other sections of
the article have information of great value.
4. Quoted in Donald L. Winters, Henry Cantwell Wallace: As Secretary
of Agriculture 1921-1924 (Urbana, 1970), 69. Another who wrote even more
strongly against the mania-buying was a young economist at Iowa State
University, Dr. Edwin G. Nourse, later a nationally recognized authority on
agricultural economics: ". . . Iowa land [may go to $500 or $1,000 an acre) but
that is no excuse for paying such prices now if the earning power . . . is not
here, and here to stay. Every boom has a stampede of buyers just at the
climax, before the recession begins. And the last buyer is the one who gets
stung. The land boom should have stopped the day the armistice was
signed. . . ." Quoted in Murray, "Iowa Land Values," 468. Both warnings
were good examples of "too little, too late."
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politics as well. Few Americans could ever master the simple
economic principle that foreign debts can be settled in only
three ways: gold, services, or goods, or some combination of
the three. Our European allies found it difficult to pay their
"war debts" and at the same time import farm produce from us.
Fortunately for humanitarian purposes but unfortunately
for the economic situation, the war ended somewhat unex-
pectedly in November 1918 instead of some time in 1919 or
later, as had been the expectation in early 1918 when crops were
planted and the industrial plant tooled up for record outputs.
Now that "peace had broken out," no one was ready with plans
for the transition to a peacetime economy. Momentum carried
the economy through the year 1919 because continued aid to
Europe allowed United States exports to hold up, and the return
of some two million service men added to the domestic demand.
The safety net of guaranteed minimum prices for certain crops
was maintained.
Even so, national leaders made some mistakes in 1919 and
1920 that were certain to bring on disaster in succeeding years.
First of all, in keeping with textbook ideas on economic theory.
President Wilson favored a quick return to the principles of a
free enterprise economy. He may have remembered that Adam
Smith had allowed for abandonment of that philosophy in war-
time and in other crises, but he did not grasp the idea that the
transition to peace was really a part of a war situation. Nothing
was done to assist those farmers who had taken the govern-
ment's advice and their private bankers' advice and mortgaged
their farms (and their souls) to the hilt in order to buy more
land. Instead, the Federal Reserve Bank, in its first real test of
wisdom since creation of the system in 1913, chose this time as
the occasion for raising the discount rate, thus cutting off or
reducing credit for farmers at the very time that credit was most
needed.' Then, as part of the messy story of the return of the
railroads to private ownership after wartime control, the Inter-
5. A fierce debate has taken place over the merits or demerits of the
Federal Reserve policy in this instance. Arthur S. Link, "The Federal Reserve
Policy and the Agricultural Depression of 1920-21," Agricultural History




state Commerce Commission authorized the rails to raise freight
rates, 25 percent or more, adding to the farmers' woes in a time
when the railroads still enjoyed a virtual monopoly on freight
hauling.' The crowning blow was the withdrawal of the war-
time price controls in 1920, at a time too late for adjustments in
spring planting. Guarantees for wheat, for example, came off at
midnight on May 31, 1920, with little advance warning.' Soon
after, the rug was pulled from under our European friends and
real allies, and a protective tariff followed in 1921 and 1922.
Prices of farm produce and farmland plummeted; from a war-
time prosperity the country plunged into a peacetime depres-
sion. The "thud at the bottom" of the ladder which Secretary
Wallace had prophesied took the form of a prolonged depres-
sion of disastrous proportions, a story filled with foreclosed
mortgages and bank failures.' Any description of the present
farm economy must begin with this reference to the episode of
1914 to 1920.
From this point onward, the story—not only of the 1920s
and 1930s but down to the present—is a story with a simple
theme: the search for a scheme, plan, operating philosophy,
whatever, with or without government assistance, whereby
farmers who own or rent farmland, some of it as good as the
best anywhere in the world, with the best field power in the
world at their disposal, can live and produce with reasonable
hopes of long-run profit, security, and a chance to enjoy the
6. Winters, Henry Cantwell Wallace, 66, 191-96.
7. See Wallaces' Farmer, 11 June 1920, 1566-67, for E. E. Reynolds'
weekly column, "Farm Interests at Washington," which includes these state-
ments: "Federal control of wheat and wheat products ended June 1st, which
means the passing of the government guarantees of $2.20 a bushel for wheat,
established during the war. . . . A powerful effort was made to have the
government continue its price guarantee another year. Quite a number of
representative grain growers from Oklahoma and other western states . . .
said they favored extension of price control, providing some other agency of
enforcement were established to take the place of the Federal Grain Corpora-
tion. . . . "
8. A good factual summary of statistical data on the farm depression,
nationwide, is in Theodore Saloutos, The American Farmer and the New Deal
(Ames, Iowa, 1982), 3-14. The same can be said for James H. Shideler, Farm
Crisis 1919-1923 (Berkeley, 1957), 46-75. For the effects on Iowa farm families,
good descriptions can be found in Carl Hamilton, In No Time At All (Ames,
Iowa, 1974), 25-33 and James Hearst, Time Like A Furrow (Iowa City, 1981),
123-34.
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same good life as their counterparts in the towns and cities.' It
remains to be asserted that this formula does not include the re-
quest for any special treatment or consideration by the govern-
ment over or above that given to any other segment of the
economy and the social structure of the nation.
In the very midst of the breakdown of the farm economy in
1919-20, two developments should be noted. The first is the
birth and growth of the American Farm Bureau Federation
(AFBF), which soon superseded its rivals as the leading, most of
the time the acknowledged, spokesman for American agricul-
ture. As a force working for a better life for the farm popula-
tion, Iowans can take just pride in the part therein played by
some of its citizens. Beginning in 1912 with the formation of
township and county organizations under various names, by
1916 the name "Farm Bureau" had become the preferred title.
Clinton County claims the honor of being the first to organize;
Marshall County was second. Black Hawk was third, and soon
every county had its own bureau—Pottawattamie had two. A
state organization followed in 1918, with James R. Howard of
Marshall County as the first president and John Walter Cover-
dale of Clinton County the first secretary. These two men had
leading roles in the formation of a national group in 1919-20,
emerging with the same offices. The organization's day-to-day
manager and lobbyist on the Washington scene was Gray Silver
of West Virginia."
Almost simultaneously came the organization of the Farm
Bloc in the Senate and later in the House. Some overlook that
the first step in organization was a preliminary meeting held in
Des Moines in the offices of the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation at
which Senator William S. Kenyon of Iowa and four Iowa
congressmen set forth the guiding principles for the Farm Bloc in
9. Saloutos, American Farmer and the New Deal, 15-33; Cochrane,
Development of American Agriculture, 116-21.
10. Robert P. Howard, James R. Howard and the Farm Bureau (Ames,
Iowa, 1983), 102-141; D. B. Groves and Kenneth Thatcher, The First Fifty:
History of the Farm Bureau in Iowa (Des Moines, 1968), 1-47. The special con-
tribution of the book on James R. Howard is that it makes clear that Howard
wanted the good life for farmers, but he wanted it to come by virtue of a good
income and economic independence. It follows that he wanted the AFBF to
support policies that aimed in this direction.
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operation: to work for anything favorable for agriculture and to
work against anything unfavorable to agriculture." Kenyon
gathered eleven other senators into a tightly-knit well disci-
plined group, soon to be called by the French label of "bloc,"
working with and sometimes taking orders from Gray Silver
and Jim Howard. A bit later a group of one hundred members
of the House, led by Congressman Lester B. Dickinson of Iowa,
added its clout to their program. President Coolidge and Secre-
tary Hoover of the Department of Commerce opposed this
move on behalf of farmers with every means at their command,
but without success. The AFBF and the Farm Bloc combined
forces to enact several pieces of important legislation for the
benefit of agriculture, which are still in effect, notably the
Packers and Stockyards Act, the Grain Futures Trading Act,
and the Capper-Volstead Act which exempted farm
cooperatives from antitrust laws.^ ^
An important part of this new activity and the new spirit
among farm leaders was an interest in the new idea known as
"equality for agriculture." This general and somewhat nebulous
idea to which all farmers and many others could pay lip service
as a specific idea was the brain child and promotional project of
George N. Peek, president, and Hugh S. Johnson, general
counsel, of the Moline Plow Company. They had self-centered
interests, of course, but also had the interest of all of American
agriculture at heart. The basis of their plan for the benefit of
farming interests was the principle of a tariff equivalent which
would do for agriculture what the protective tariff had done for
certain segments of American industry. In broad detail the idea
contemplated two markets, the domestic, on which farmers
would sell as much as possible of their product at the American
price, and the foreign market, on which they would sell through
an export corporation as much as possible at the world price—
whatever price it would bring. The latter price would almost in-
evitably mean a loss for American producers, a loss which
would be made up by an "equalization fee," assessed on all pro-
11. Leiand L. Sage, A History of Iowa (Ames, Iowa, 1974), 260-61, and
360 (fn 28), where the Des Moines Register, 14 November 1920, is cited for the
Iowa meeting.
12. Howard, James R. Howard, 174-77; Winters, Henry Cantwell
Wallace, 80-81, 200-216, 197-99, 86-8.
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ducers. A special tariff wall would be erected to protect the
American market from a backwash of the produce which had
been dumped on the world market." The net effect would be an
increase in income for farmers and the achievement of parity.
Although the Peek-Johnson plan had been bruited about
for some time, its authors hoped that it could be presented and
explained before the nation and the world at a National Con-
ference on Agriculture to be held in Washington in early 1923.
The conference was ostensibly called by President Warren G.
Harding, who had accepted the idea from his secretary of
agriculture, Henry C. Wallace. Secretary Wallace was pre-
occupied with other requests and recommendations for speak-
ing time on the formal program of the conference and rejected
Peek and Johnson's bid for an invitation to speak without so
much as looking at the contents. The two men therefore had to
be contented with making a brief explanation of the prevailing
conditions which they hoped their plan would relieve. As Henry
C. Wallace's biographer explains: "The episode would not have
been significant, except for the fact that Wallace was eventually
to turn to the 'Peek plan' after other solutions to the farm probT
lem had failed.""
So would others turn to the Peek-Johnson plan, including
Henry Agard Wallace, who had succeeded his father as editor of
Wallaces' Farmer, and Frank Orren Lowden, former governor
of Illinois. It was taken over in the Senate by Charles L.
McNary of Oregon and in the House by Gilbert N. Haugen of
Northwood, Iowa. In all there were five different McNary-
Haugen bills; two passed both chambers only to be vetoed by
President Coolidge. He could claim good company in James R.
Howard of Iowa, recently president of. the AFBF, who thought
that the plan would not work."
13. George N. Peek and Hugh Johnson, Eijua/ify for Agriculture (1922;
2nd ed., Moline, Illinois, 1922); Gilbert C. Fite, George N. Peek and the Fight
for Farm Parity (Norman, OK, 1954); Murray R. Benedict, Farm Policies of
the United States (New York, 1953), 207-238, has a very complete treatment.
14. Winters, Henry Cantwell Wallace, 155.
15. Ibid., 25, 297-98; William T. Hutchinson, Lowden of Illinois: The Life
of Frank O. Lowden, 2 vols. (Chicago, 1957), 2:553-83; Roger Taylor
Johnson, "Charles L. McNary and the Republican Party during Prosperity and
Depression" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of Wisconsin, 1967); Earle
Douglas Ross, "Gilbert Nelson Haugen," Dictionary of American Biography,
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By the time of the second veto the plan had become a
political issue that had little to do with its merits. The issue took
the form of a question: Should the government do something
for agriculture? President Coolidge, strongly backed by his
secretary of commerce, Herbert Hoover of California,^* and his
secretary of the treasury, Andrew Mellon, upheld the negative
view; Lowden, Henry A. Wallace, and most AFBF members
took up the fight for the proponents. The real decision came at
the Republican National Convention at Kansas City rather than
in the halls of Congress; Hoover easily bowled over Lowden for
the nomination, thereby dealing a virtual death blow to the
Peek-Johnson plan. Such was the temper of the times that
thousands of Iowa farmers switched their votes, some to Al
Smith in 1928 and many more to Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932,
partly because they indicated a deep concern for farmers.
Roosevelt's victory is credited to his success in building an East-
West-South coalition; true, but it should be stressed that such a
coalition included thousands of Iowa farmers and agribusiness-
men and their fellows all over the Midwest who were enacting a
silent revolution in their desertion of the Republican party.
As an economist and political scientist. Hoover was justi-
fied, in the opinion of many, then and later, in opposing
McNary-Haugenism, but as a grassroots politician he made the
mistake of not overtly showing his sympathy for the plight of
the farmers and their allies in agribusiness. To give Hoover his
due, it is not at all true or fair to accuse him of being devoid of
sympathy for farmers. Unfortunately, he could only theorize
that Europe would not long permit the United States to dump its
21-:384-85; Howard, James R. Howard, 190-91, 208-210. I have derived great
benefit from the opportunity to read in manuscript an unpublished biography
of Haugen: Peter T. Harstad and Bonnie. L. Michael, "Gilbert N. Haugen:
Norwegian-American Politician From Iowa." Hopefully this will soon be
published.
16. The author does not mean to commit an act of treason to Iowa by
calling Hoover a Californian. The facts are that birth in a state does not make
a person a "son" of that state, nor do seven years of boyhood in Iowa make an
"Iowan." In going before the Republican National Convention of 1928 as a
candidate, Hoover's managers denominated him a "Californian," for obvious
reasons. Except as a vote-getting ploy when he made his first campaign speech
at West Branch, Hoover showed little interest in his Iowa connections until ap-
proaching the end of his career.
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surpluses on their shores, an argument not well understood by
farmers. If actions speak louder than words, it should be noted
that the first important piece of legislation in his administration
was one for farmers: the Farm Marketing Act of 1929." Of
course, by that time, he ^ had already lost the farmer vote.
Hoover believed, as had others for years gone by, that coopera-
tives, properly managed, would suffice as a remedy for farmers'
troubles. He had a place for farmer organizations in his theory
of the "associative state."^* He was at least a temporary convert
to the idea that government must take a hand in assisting
business when it becomes a victim of circumstances beyond its
control; he had the misfortune of not extending that philosophy
to farmers in the same degree and in the same spirit that he dis-
played in his cooperation with the savings and loan industry,
banks, insurance companies, and railroads, in saving them from
total failure and ruin.
The late twenties and early thirties were remarkable for
illustrations of how ordinarily peaceful law-abiding citizen-
farmers could approach the breaking point as economic
desperation drove them to the edge of despair, occasionally to
violence. In Milo Reno such men met their ideal leader as if fore-
ordained for the role." A lay preacher-exhorter by inclination,
he had the oratorical powers necessary for stirring men to ac-
tion, though he was no rabble-rouser. He would have been
more at home among the individualists who made up the
Populists of the 1890s than in the more highly developed
17. U.S. Statutes at Large, 71 Cong., 1 Sess., 11-19. There the act is titled
the "Agricultural Marketing Act."
18. Ellis W. Hawley, The Great War and the Search for a Modern Order:
A History of the American People and Their Institutions, 1917-1933 (New
York, 1979), 100-104; Hawley, "Herbert Hoover and Economic Stabilization,
1921-22," in Ellis W. Hawley, ed., Herbert Hoover as Secretary of Commerce:
Studies in New Era Thought and Practice (Iowa City, 1980), 43-77.
19. Roland White, Milo Reno: Farmers Union Pioneer (Iowa Gity, 1941);
John L. Shover, Corn Belt Rebellion: The Farmers Holiday Movement
(Urbana, 1965). The latter is virtually a biography of Milo Reno, far superior
to the Roland White book. Lowell K. Dyson, Red Harvest: The Communist
Party and American Farmers (Lincoln, NE, 1982), has much material on Reno
and the Farmers Holiday activities, including contacts with Communist
operatives in Iowa and adjacent states, but little biographical data of note.
Dyson attributes Reno's radical hell-raising temperament to his mother, an
erstwhile Granger and Greenbacker.
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capitalistic agricultural environment of the 1920s and 1930s.
The Farmers Holiday Movement which he directed—the road
blockades and milk dumping of 1932-33—does not seem in
retrospect so outrageous when one considers the years of hard-
ship these men had suffered. The program of "demands" which
he presented to the General Assembly of Iowa on March 13 on
behalf of some three thousand protesting farmers, makes tame
reading today. One demand called for the same sort of protec-
tion for farmers as had been arranged for bankers in the Bank
Holiday; another demanded a "dollar" which would serve as an
"honest, measure of value"; still another demanded a national
moratorium on mortgage foreclosures; another, the refinancing
of mortgages with fiat money (presumably similar to the Green-
backs of 1862); another demanded a government takeover of
the banking and currency system as a public utility. A steeply
graduated income tax, "cost of production" for farmers, passage
of the soldiers' bonus bill, representation of farmers in the draft-
ing of new agricultural legislation—all seem reasonable enough,
as do the Populists' demands in their platform of 1892 when
read in the context of ideas accepted later by the major parties.
The only negative demand was for Congress not to waste
money on congressional hearings on the "non-sensical domestic
allotment" bill. One item set May 3, 1933, as the deadline for
"legislative justice" or a strike might be called. By that time
enough had been done in Washington and Des Moines that
Reno would not lose face by calling off the threat of a strike.
This was his last bid for attention to the farmers' troubles. Each
bit of progess towards relief reduced his influence propor-
tionately. Compared with the reprehensible actions of the mobs
in Primghar and Le Mars in humiliating officers of the law and a
distinguished district judge, Reno seems quite honorable and
law abiding.^"
Other papers in the remaining programs will cover the New
Deal relief measures for agriculture. It may be asked, however,
if farmers were better off in 1940 than in 1920. It is generally
20. Shover, Corn Belt Rebellion, is the best source in print for following
the varied activities of Milo Reno and the Fanners Holiday movement. The
thirteen demands as presented to the General Assembly of Iowa are reprinted
in Sage, A History of Iowa, 296.
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agreed that the New Deal had not helped as much as its cham-
pions have claimed for it; that there was a depression in 1937
through 1938, from which the nation was rescued by the coming
of World War II. In many ways it seems that farmers were
better off in 1940 as compared with 1920. Undoubtedly the stan-
dard of living had improved, at least in material things. In 1920
tractor farming employed only 246,000 machines; in 1930,
920,000; in 1940, the figure was up to 1.6 million." This meant
that the means of farming had been made much easier and less
time consuming; farmers could now take jobs in nearby towns
and cities and still complete their farm work. Later figures
would show that income from this extra work exceeded the
farm income. Farm wives were not forgotten in this drive
towards the use of machinery. Electrical appliances made
housework and farm chores easier; no longer were wives ex-
pected to look after the garden and the chickens and save their
"egg money." Farm wives shopped for food and clothing in
towns and cities and made a good showing compared with their
urban sisters. The family car or cars made church attendance
and movie going in town the order of the day; family cars and
school buses made township or county schools available for the
children. The use of hybrid seed corn was now universal and
soybeans were a new cash crop. Commercial fertilizers had
become commonplace. In short, farming had become more of a
business than just a way of life. Ding Darling's straw-sucking,
bib-overalled, fat, jolly farmer type was no longer true to life,
one his few anachronisms.
Our era of examination began with the coming of peace
after a great world war and it ends with the United States stand-
ing on the brink of entrance into another such war, in some
ways already a participant though not yet a combatant. Again
the nation was enjoying prosperity caused by war markets. No
American wants this kind of solution to our farm problem, nor
do we want the solution of a garrison state. Autarchy cannot be
enforced without an authoritarian state and cannot be long en-
dured by a people long accustomed to freedom. For reasons of
prosperity and for peace of mind, the farmer is directly in-




terested in peace, as much so as any citizen in the land. The
decline in the number of farms and farmers has brought the
farm population to the astounding figure of only 2 to 3 percent
of the nation's population, but with the people's dependence on
food and the support of those in agribusiness and more distantly
related areas of the economy, farmers can still wield vast in-
fluence." There are more important things to be considered
than prosperity; perhaps our farmers will lead the way.
22. Gilbert C. Fite, American Farmers: The New Minority (Bloomington,
IN, 1981), is a masterful study of American farming in the twentieth century,
stressing the striking fact that more and more,acres of farmland are being
farmed by fewer and fewer people who produce more and more from these
larger farms, resulting in a decline in farm population from 75-h percent of the
total in the eighteenth century to the 2 to 3 percent of today.
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